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MIDDLE EAST NEGOTIATIONS: Egypt may respond to Israel's latest note to Jarring.

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MIDDLE EAST NEGOTIATIONS: EGYPT MAY RESPOND TO ISRAEL'S LATEST NOTE TO JARRING WITH A REQUEST FOR FOUR-POWER INTERVENTION IN THE NEGOTIATIONS OR FOR A SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING, AN ACTION THEY HAD EARLIER AGREED TO DEFER.

THE EGYPTIAN REACTION TO THE NOTE TO JARRING WAS WHOLLY NEGATIVE. EGYPTIAN AMBASSADOR ZAYYAT CHARACTERIZED THE DOCUMENT AS "HUMILIATING" AND "WORSE" THAN THE PREVIOUS ISRAELI PAPER. ZAYYAT TOLD JARRING THAT DESPITE THE ISRAELIS' KNOWLEDGE OF HOW MUCH IMPORTANCE THE EGYPTIANS ATTACH TO WITHDRAWAL, THEY HAD MENTIONED IT ONLY CASUALLY. JARRING HIMSELF WAS REPORTED TO BE DEEPLY DISAPPOINTED THAT ISRAEL HAD FAILED TO BE ANY MORE EXPLICIT ON THIS QUESTION.

ON 28 JANUARY, ZAYYAT TRANSMITTED TO SECRETARY GENERAL THANT A PERSONAL APPEAL FROM EGYPTIAN FOREIGN MINISTER RIAD THAT JARRING'S REPORT ON THE STATUS OF THE TALKS NOT BE ISSUED UNTIL MONDAY. THANT IS APPARENTLY INCLINED TO OBLIGE. ZAYYAT DID NOT SPECIFICALLY NOTE THE REASON FOR THIS REQUEST. HE SPOKE OF THE POSSIBLE NEED, HOWEVER, FOR SECURITY COUNCIL OR FOUR-POWER ACTION TO JUSTIFY AN EXTENSION OF THE CEASE-FIRE, IN LIGHT OF THE EGYPTIAN VIEW THAT THE JARRING TALKS HAD MADE NO PROGRESS.

MEANWHILE, THE ISRAELIS HAVE REGISTERED THEIR VIEW ON THE QUESTION OF GUARANTEES IN THE FOUR-POWER DISCUSSIONS. ISRAELI AMBASSADOR RABIN INFORMED ASSISTANT SECRETARY SISCO ON 27 JANUARY THAT ISRAEL REGARDED ANY FOUR-POWER DISCUSSION OF GUARANTEES OR SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES AS A GREAT MISTAKE THAT MIGHT WELL AFFECT ISRAEL'S CONDUCT OF THE TALKS. RABIN REITERATED THE ISRAELI POSITION THAT GUARANTEES COULD NOT BE A SUBSTITUTE FOR DEFENSIBLE BOUNDARIES, AND "DEFENSIBLE BOUNDARIES," RABIN SAID, DID NOT MEAN MINOR RECTIFICATIONS OF PRE-WAR LINES.

ZAYYAT INFORMED AMBASSADOR YOST ON 28 JANUARY OF THE EGYPTIAN UNDERSTANDING THAT THE US WAS PREPARED TO DISCUSS GUARANTEES IN THE FOUR-POWER TALKS IF CAIRO AGREED NOT TO CALL FOR A SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING. ZAYYAT SAID THAT EGYPT WAS DEEPLY DISAPPOINTED THE US HAD REFUSED TO BEGIN THESE DISCUSSIONS AT THE FOUR-POWER MEETING ON THE PREVIOUS DAY.

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